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In the months prior to the stock market crash of 1929, the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange
was abnormally low.  Rising stock prices and volume should have driven up seat prices during the
boom of 1929; instead there were negative cumulative abnormal returns to seats of approximately
20 percent in the months just before the crash.  At the same time, trading nearly ceased in the thin
markets for seats on the regional exchanges.  Brokers appear thus to have anticipated the October 1929
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On October 3, 1929, John D. Rockefeller sold his right to a quarter of a new seat 
on the New York Stock Exchange for $125,000.   Only a few days before on September 
26, 1929, J. P. Morgan and Junius S. Morgan, Jr. had sold their rights for the same price, 
which  represented  the  highest  real  price  that  would  ever  be  paid  for  a  seat  on  the 
exchange.
1    Like  other  members  of  the  exchange  they  had  received  these  rights  on 
February 18, 1929 in a plan to expand the capacity of the exchange and meet the flood of 
orders that flowed from the stock market boom (Davis, Neal and White, 2005).  While 
not active brokers, they, like at least another hundred wealthy men, reserved the option to 
appear on the floor of the exchange to intervene directly in the market if a merger, proxy 
fight or perhaps a panic loomed.  These titans of industry and finance could have sold 
their rights at any time beforehand, but they held on to them.  Their sales seem to have 
been extraordinarily well-timed.  The Dow Jones had reached its peak on September 3, 
1929 and then began a slow decline.  Rockefeller and the Morgans sold as the boom 
deflated  and  just  ahead  of  the  collapses  on  Black  Thursday  October  24  and  Black 
Tuesday October 29, 1929 when the market lost 23 percent of its value. 
  While neither Rockefeller nor the Morgans left any hint of whether their timing 
was prescient or lucky, their sales raise the question whether the brokers knew something 
about the state of the market in September and early October 1929 that the investing 
public  did  not.    Brokers  would  certainly  be  classified  among  the  more  informed 
participants in the market. A large literature in finance claims that brokers have valuable 
                                                 
1 The price of a seat for the purchasers Charles J. Collins and Andrew J. Fox, Jr. who put together four 
quarter seats was thus $500,000.  Just before the distribution of the quarter rights in the week ending on 
January 24, 1929, the price of a seat first reached its peak $625,000; ex-rights, the price would have been 
$500,000.  The 2005 price of a 1929 $500,000 seat adjusted by the CPI or the GDP deflator would be $5.7 
million or $4.7 million respectively, while the highest nominal price attained was $4 million in December 
2005.    3 
private  information  because  they  observe  order  flows,  permitting  them  to  profit 
strategically from timely trading or market making.  Did the brokers suspect that there 
was a bubble in the market that was in danger of collapse?    A quick sell-off of rights to 
a seat and a precipitous fall in the price of a seat on the exchange would be evidence that 
these insiders knew that trouble loomed ahead, while an “excessively” high seat price in 
the presence of declining share prices might be an indication that brokers were exhibiting 
the same mistaken exuberance as their customers. 
  Examining seat prices and the abnormal returns to seats on the NYSE, the New 
York Curb Exchange and several regional exchanges, this paper considers the possibility 
that brokers anticipated the crash.  It appears that they became quite cautious by July 
1929 and were paying far less for a seat than might otherwise seem justified by the rising 
volume of trading, higher securities prices and other positive indicators.  In the months 
preceding  the  crash,  qualitative  evidence  suggests  that  buyers  were  increasingly  very 
young  and  relatively  inexperienced.    Brokers  on  the  Curb  Exchange  in  New  York 
exhibited a similar disbelief as the prices paid for seats on their exchange fell far short of 
forecast prices.  Regional stock exchanges were also swept up in the 1928-1929 boom; 
but  unfortunately,  the  seats  on  the  regional  exchange  were  too  illiquid  to  adequately 
measure the determinants of their prices.  Still, the prices of regional seats flattened after 
mid-1929 and sales were scant, suggestive of a worry that the buoyant market would 
collapse.   
The  sobriety  of  the  1929  brokers  stands  in  contrast  to  Keim  and  Madhavan’s 
(2000) finding that brokers were excessively optimistic in the months before the 1987.  
For the crash of 2000, inference is more difficult because the number of seats traded has   4 
diminished.
2  Nevertheless, it appears that brokers during the most recent boom were 
more like their brethren in 1929 and skeptical of the markets’ advance.  NYSE seat prices 
reached a high in August 1999 and then fell 13% before the peak of the Dow Jones Index 
in December 1999, 25% before the peak of the Nasdaq in March 2000, and 37% before 
the August 2000 high in S&P500.  
 However,  even  though  seats  on  the  NYSE  in  1929  appear  to  have  signaled 
brokers’  uncertainty  about  the  future  course  of  the  market,  this  phenomenon  did  not 
provide the public with enough information to revise its judgment about share prices.  
Consistent with other studies (Schwert, 1977; Keim and Madhavan, 2000) seat prices do 
not contain any information that would have allowed investors to forecast the behavior of 
the stock market.   Like other market anomalies, the lack of robust growth in seat prices 
on all exchanges, as the stock market boom continued after mid-1929, should have given 
observant investors some second thoughts about pouring more money into the market.  
Yet,  they  may  have  just  assumed  that  relatively  low  seat  prices  were  caused  by  the 
general  increase  in  the  number  of  seats  and  exchanges.      Efforts  by  existing  market 
institutions to restructure themselves to respond to the huge order flow probably rendered 
otherwise  clear  signals  opaque.    However,  the  econometric  evidence  in  this  paper 
indicates that, given the prices brokers paid, these men on the floor of these exhanges 




                                                 
2 Many seats are owned by large publicly traded companies and there is less turnover than when seats were 
owned by individual brokers.   5 
Bubbles and the Price of a Seat on the Exchange 
The debate over whether there are bubbles in the stock market has spawned a 
large  literature.    It  has  proven  extraordinarily  difficult  to  provide  a  tight  case  for  or 
against  the  presence  of  a  bubble  in  the  market  because  fundamentals  are  difficult  to 
identify.  As Flood and Hodrick (1990) pointed out, any test for a bubble is troubled by 
the problem that the dynamics of asset prices with a bubble will not appear to different 
from the dynamics when there is an omitted factor driving the fundamentals.  Studies 
which  purport  to  find  a  bubble  can  be  attacked  for  failing  to  find  some  missing 
fundamental, while results where the conclusion is that there is no bubble are highly 
sensitive to the choice of parameters (See White, 2006).  
While it is generally  conceded that boom periods see an influx of new, often 
younger, and less informed investors, many models employ only a representative agent.  
Yet, we know that no matter how many optimists poured their money into the market, 
skeptics were also present and must also have voted with their dollars. Thus, one of the 
more potentially fruitful approaches is the identification of anomalies that may indicate 
the presence of a bubble.  Avoiding the problem of mis-identifying fundamentals, De 
Long and Shleifer (1991) examined the prices of closed-end mutual funds, where the 
fundamental value of a specific fund is simply the current market value of the securities 
in the fund’s portfolio.  They found that the median seasoned fund sold for a premium of 
37 percent in the first quarter of 1929, rising to 47 percent in the third quarter, before 
subsiding to 8 percent by December 1929.  Contrary to the usual small discount generally 
observed for closed end mutual funds, this huge premium is astonishing.    Instead of 
buying a fund that was above its fundamentals’ price, investors could simply have been   6 
purchased a portfolio of the underlying stocks or entrepreneurs could have created new 
funds  with  the  same  stocks.    The  only  consistent  explanation  is  that  investors  were 
excessively  optimistic,  suggesting  the  existence  of  a  bubble.    Rappoport  and  White 
(1994) found evidence in the market for brokers’ loans that lenders were very skeptical of 
the height that the market had attained in late 1929.  The extraordinary interest premia 
and margin demanded on these loans suggest that lenders felt they needed this protection 
against  a  potentially  huge  decline  in  the  market.      Casting  brokers’  loans  as  options 
written by the lender and bought by the borrowers, Rappoport and White extracted the 
volatility implied by the price of these loans as options, revealing the potential for a crash 
on the order of 25 to 50 percent, well in advance of October 1929.  
  Like brokers’ loans that carried high interest rate premia and margins, relatively 
low prices for seats on a stock exchange when the market was booming is evidence of 
contrarian  expectations  from  individuals  with  their  hand  on  the  pulse  of  the  market.  
Seats on the exchange are assets whose prices reflect stockbrokers' expected future profits 
from  the  special  access  to  the  market  provided  by  a  seat.    As  such,  seat  prices  are 
influenced by the volume, stock prices, technology, and the rules that govern trading on 
the exchange.   Although seats are capital assets, the number is fixed and they cannot be 
sold short, making it more likely that a bubble can be observed (Keim and Madhavan, 
2000).  A rapid run up in the price of a seat may thus reveal the sentiment of the holders 
regarding  their  trading  for  exuberant  investors,  while  a  depressed  price  may  be  an 
indicator of a bearish outlook.   7 
What did brokers expect in 1929? Figure 1 shows monthly indices of the Dow 
Jones Industrial Average and the price of a seat on the New York Stock Exchange.
3  The 
value of a seat on the exchange roughly tracked the movement of stock prices through the 
mid-1920s.   At that point, volume on the exchange began to rise rapidly and seat prices 
began their rapid ascent.  On peak days, the exchange was flooded with orders and bid-
ask spreads began to widen.  The leadership at the exchange feared that investors would 
move to other exchanges and offered a modest proposal in 1925 to expand the 1,100 seat 
exchange by 25 new seats.  This plan  was rejected by the membership; without any 
action, the problems became chronic by 1928.  On October 15, 1928, the president of the 
exchange put forward a new proposal to expand the exchange by giving each member a 
quarter-seat dividend that could be sold and bundled to create 275 new seats, thereby 
expanding the membership by 25 percent.  Davis, Neal and White (2005) have shown 
that  this  bold  plan  eased  the  capacity  constraint  on  peak  load  days,  minimizing  the 
widening of the bid-ask spread.  This fact was appreciated by the membership who saw 
that the competitiveness of the exchange was thereby improved.   In anticipation of sales 
of these seats, seat prices rose and yielded a cumulative abnormal return to seat holders of 










                                                 
3 There is higher frequency data.  The NYSE Committee on Admissions (n.d.) recorded all transfers of 
membership from 1879 to 1971 for each week ending Thursday, giving the price but not the actual day of 
the transaction.   8 
Figure 1 






















































Unadjusted Adjusted for Split Dow Jones
First News of Seat Dividend Oct. 15, 1928
First Trading in New Seats Feb. 14, 1929




The publicly reported prices for NYSE seats did not adjust for the stock split and 
they were reported ex-right.  Figure 1 corrects for this added value, showing the original 
and the adjusted series.  Although adjusted prices did not sag as much as ex-right seat 
prices they do trend downwards from the beginning of seat sales until the end of June 
1929.    This  movement  is  puzzling.    Perhaps  brokers  did  not  correctly  anticipate  the 
effects of increased competition from a 25 percent increase in the number of brokers or 
perhaps there was now more competition from the expansion of other exchanges in the 
United States.   The stock market boom was still on and volume was high although the 
Dow-Jones’ rapid rise had moderated, as seen in Figure 1.  But beginning in June 1929   9 
and continuing until the beginning of October, the price of a seat recovered all its lost 
value.   Maybe the pessimism of the first half of the year turned into buoyant optimism?  
A simple model of the pricing of seats provides some insight into this question. 
 
Were NYSE Brokers’ Optimistic or Pessimistic? 
  Seats on the stock exchange are capital assets whose price reflects the brokers’ 
expected future profits from the special access to trading on the floor of the exchange 
offered to them by a seat.   The value of seats on an exchange is determined by the 
volume of activity on the exchange and the degree of competition among traders on the 
exchange and between the exchange and the rest of the market.  The behavior of returns 
to a seat on the NYSE and the expectations of brokers before the 1929 crash can be 
studied by applying a basic capital asset pricing model and examining the cumulative 
abnormal returns (Schwert 1977; Keim and Madhavan, 2000).  Information from trading 
activity is measured by the current and lagged volume, both over the last thirty days and 
the change in the daily volume to capture both elements of trend and transitory factors.  
Keim and Madhavan included additional factors, relative to size and value/growth from 
Fama and French (1993), to identify the non-diversifiable risk of an asset.
4  For this 
period,  there  are  proxies  for  the  former  but  not  the  latter  factor.      I  estimated  the 
following regression: 












￿i  SizePrem t-i  + ￿ t   
                                                 
4 They were a size premium, measured as the difference between a small stock return and a large stock 
return, and a value growth factor, measured, as the difference in a portfolio of high to low book-to-market 
returns.  According to Fama and French (1993) firms that have high book-to-market ratios tend to have 
lower and persistently lower earnings.  They also find that size is related to profitability, as small firms tend 
to have lower earnings on assets than big firms.   10 
where Rt   is the return on a seat on the New York Stock exchange over time t, rf, t is the 
risk free rate, measured by the 3 to 6-month rate on U.S. Treasury notes and certificates 
(Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Banking and Monetary Statistics, 
1943,  p.  460)  or  the  4  to  6-month  commercial  paper  rate  (Banking  and  Monetary 
Statistics,  1943,  p.450-451).    The  market  return,  rm,  is  the  return  on  the  Dow  Jones 
Industrials.  The figures for daily and monthly volume are for the NYSE, and the size 
premium is the difference in the returns between the Dow Jones index, an unweighted 
index of 20 and later 30 of the very largest firms, and the Federal Reserve Board’s Index 
(Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1943, pp. 480-481), a weighted stock market index 
that includes several hundred stocks.   It is conjectured that the greater the difference, the 
greater the return on exchange seats as the business of the exchange focused on larger, 
more prominent stocks. 
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Table 1 
Monthly Returns to a Seat on the New York Stock Exchange 
 
The standard errors are reported below the coefficient and * and + indicate significance at 
the 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
Table  1  reports  the  monthly  results  for  1920-1933  and  two  sub-periods.
5  
Although only one lag is used, the results are quite robust to various lag structures and 
alternate periods for the purpose of estimating seat prices or abnormal returns.  Splitting 
the sample at the end of 1927 before the boom reveals that seat prices in this period 
responded to changes in market information as embodied in the Dow Jones quickly but 
                                                 
5 Regressions with weekly seat prices, but more limited independent variables, yielded similar results. 
























Intercept  -0.002  -0.002  0.006  0.004  -0.012  -0.010 
  0.008  0.008  0.007  0.007  0.016  0.015 
rm, t – rf, t  0.973*  0.970*  0.639*  0.717*  0.964*  0.971* 
  0.128  0.128  0.203  0.261  0.178  0.179 
rm, t-1 – rf, t-1  -0.312*  -0.336*  0.108  0.167  -0.486*  -0.487* 
  0.130  0.129  0.254  0.256  0.181  0.181 
 Monthly Vol t   0.051*  0.055*  0.008  0.008  0.085  0.088+ 
  0.029  0.029  0.033  0.033  0.048  0.048 
Monthly Vol t-1  0.063*  0.0677*  0.022  0.025  0.093  0.097* 
  0.027  0.027  0.031  0.031  0.044  0.043 
 Daily Vol t   0.038*  0.036*  0.003  0.01  0.062  0.056* 
  0.016  0.016  0.021  0.021  0.024  0.023 
Daily Vol t-1  -0.015  -0.015  0.009  -0.001  -0.026  -0.028 
  0.016  0.016  0.021  0.021  0.026  0.025 
SizePrem t   0.339+  0.364+  0.693  0.626  0.234  0.226 
  0.205  0.204  0.432  0.429  0.274  0.274 
SizePrem t-1  0.104  0.090  0.325  0.385  0.083  0.064 
  0.174  0.173  0.367  0.365  0.235  0.234 
No. Obs.  166  166  96  96  70  70 
             
Adj. R  0.445  0.447  0.052  0.066  0.628  0.617   12 
not completely, given that ￿1 is less than one.  After the crash seat returns responded 
much  more  quickly.    Yet,  even  in  the  pre-crash  period  seat  returns  are  much  more 
sensitive than Keim and Madhavan found for the period 1973 to 1994 and Schwert found 
for 1926-1972.  Recent changes in volume appeared to have information for brokers as 
seat prices responded to contemporary but not lagged changes in volume.  The size factor 
often has a significant effect of seat returns. 
 
Figure 2 
































Crash Begins Oct. 24, 1929
First News of Seat Dividend
 Oct. 15, 1928
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The cumulative abnormal returns to NYSE seats from the monthly regression in 
Column  3  of  Table  1  are  shown  in  Figure  2,  which  are  measured  as  the  cumulative 
residuals from the regression.
6  This figure reveals the rise in the returns for late 1928 and 
early 1929.  In an earlier paper, Davis, Neal and White (2005) argued that the rise in the 
value of the NYSE that was a consequence of the announcement that the NYSE would 
increase its capacity by 25 percent.  This expansion would help the exchange cope with 
its declining share of volume on the national market and its capacity  constraints that 
drove  up  bid-ask  spreads  and  created  delays  on  peak  volume  days.    This  optimism 
appears  to  have  been  justified  because  after  the  275  seat  increase  the  bid-ask  spread 
moved much less when volume surged and the exchange regained some market share.   
Although observed prices of NYSE seats moved upward in the summer of 1929, 
Figures 2 reveals that after February 1929, brokers slowly became less optimistic.  For 
the monthly data, the cumulative excess returns turned negative and by the summer of 
1929 they totaled over 20 percent, implying that actual prices were far below what would 
have been expected based on the surge in stock prices and volume.   There is no recovery 
until after the crash in October.   
This  relative  pessimism  stands  in  contrast  to  Keim  and  Madhavan’s    (2000) 
finding  for  the  period  before  the  Crash  of  1987,    when  they  found  there  were  large 
positive abnormal returns to seats in the 12 months before the crash followed by large 
negative  abnormal  returns.    They  argue  that  these  findings  are  consistent  with  the 
behavioral finance interpretation that seats, which are in limited supply and cannot be 
sold short, exhibit occasional price bubbles.   To take a closer look at 1929, Figure 3 
calculates the forecast price of a seat with the actual price, revealing this widening dollar 
                                                 
6 Weekly cumulative abnormal monthly returns show similar results.   14 
gap.  By July 1929, the high share prices and ever higher volume implied that brokers 



























Forecast Seat Price Seat Price
Crash Begins, Oct. 24, 1929
First News of Seat Dividend, 
Oct 15, 1928





There are two possible explanations the apparent pessimism in Figures 3.  First, 
brokers might have erred in believing that the expansion of the exchange would increase 
its  aggregate  value.    The  increase  in  capacity  may  not  have  increased  business 
sufficiently to overcome downward pressure on the bid-ask spread.  But, based on the   15 
results of Davis, Neal and White (2005), the added increase in volume following the 
expansion  appears  to  have  outweighed  the  decline  in  bid-ask  spreads.    At  the  mean 
volume prior to the expansion, the mean percentage bid-ask spread was 0.777 percent; 
afterwards it was 0.759 percent.  Trading was consistently higher month-by-month in 
1929 compared to 1928.  In July 1928, the market value of shares traded on the NYSE 
was $52,903 million and in July 1929, it was $77,264 million (NYSE, Yearbook 1928-
1929, p. 123).  In a naïve calculation, the implied profits would have been $411 million 
for 1928 and $586 million for 1929, a greater than 25 percent increase.  Thus, higher 
earnings should have propped up seat prices.  The alternative explanation, if their hopes 
about the increased efficiency of the exchange were not disappointed, is that brokers may 
have thought that the market was excessively exuberant.  This second explanation seems 
to be more credible as their negative feelings seemed to dissipate just after the crash.  It 
may be hard to read much into later events, but brokers, like other businessmen, also 
seem to have become more hopeful of a recovery by late 1930.
7 
  Could any investor on the street watching the prices of seats on the exchange have 
read this information, or was brokers’ pessimism in the seat market unheeded Cassandra-
like signals?   It is well known that stock returns have been found to be predicted by a 
variety of observable market values, including the dividend yield, the Treasury bill yield, 
the Term Structure and the book-to-market ratio (See: Campbell and Shiller (1988), Fama 
and French (1988), and Keim and Stambaugh (1986)). Using monthly data, Keim and 
Madhavan (2000) found that the information embedded in the innovations in the number 
of seats traded on the NYSE, but not the seat prices themselves, had predictive power for 
                                                 
7 See Klug, Landon-Lane and White (2005) for a survey of this literature on expectations of recovery.   16 
the S&P500 returns for 1973-1994.  Their approach is employed using the regression 
model in equation 2:   




￿i  Seat t-i  +  ￿ 1 SizePrem t-1  +   
     ￿ 1 TreasYield t-1      + ￿ 2   TermPrem t-1    +  ￿ i  CallPrem t-1      +    ￿ i   DivYieldt-1  + ￿ t   
 
   
Information from the market for seats on the NYSE is measure both as the lagged 
innovation in the price of a seat and, following Keim and Madhavan, as the residuals 
from a regression of the number of trades on trades lagged, the log of the last seat price 
and the absolute seat return.  The difference in returns between the Dow-Jones stocks and 
all stocks traded on the NYSE is used again.  In addition the yield on 3 to 6 month U.S. 
Treasury securities and the term premium, the difference between the long-term yield and 
the  short-term  yield  are  included  (NBER  Series  13029  and  13033,  www.nber.org).  
Rappoport and White (1993, 1994) find that the premium on brokers’ loans compared to 
bankers’  acceptances  or  commercial  paper  represents  the  money  market’s  heightened 
awareness of the risk in the market during the boom; hence, the difference between the 
call loan rate and the rate on bankers’ acceptances is included in the regression.  Lastly, 
the dividend yield for Dow-Jones stocks is added (Rappoport and White, 1994). 
Table 2 reports the results for the regressions for several versions of equation 2.  
Unlike  Keim  and  Madhavan’s  findings  for  the  last  quarter  of  the  twentieth  century, 
neither changes in seat prices or news of seat trades appear to affect the returns on stocks.  
These results were robust to increases in the number of lags and curtailing the data at the 
end of 1927 to avoid the problem of the increase in the number of seats.  The only 
significant variables are the yield on short-term U.S. securities and the call loan premium.   
The yield on government securities would have signaled tighter monetary policy in 1928   17 
and elevated rate of call loans that stood at an historic 300 basis points for a long period 
was a signal of the downside risk in the market, but nothing could apparently be gleaned 
by the public from the trading activity in seats. 
 
Table 2 
Predictability of Stock Market Returns 
Monthly Data 1920.01 – 1928.06 
 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
Intercept  0.063*  .059*  0.047  0.068 
  0.023  0.033  0.041  0.069 
rm, t-1 - rf, t-1  -0.176  -0.207  -0.129  -0.151 
  0.160  0.167  0.156  0.162 
 Seat Return t-1   0.071  0.077     
  0.064  0.067     
 Seat Trade News t-1       0.003  0.000 
      0.004  0.006 
U.S. Bond Yield t-1  -0.008  -0.021*  -0.008  -0.024* 
  0.008  0.012  0.007  0.013 
 Term Premium t     -0.004    -0.009 
    0.016    0.019 
Call Premium t-1  -0.027*    -0.029*   
  0.014    0.013   
Dividend Yield t-1  -0.092  0.535  -0.086  0.606 
  0.580  0.677  0.594  0.690 
SizePrem t-1  -0.263  -0.320  -0.222  -0.275 
  0.222  0.226  0.221  0.224 
No. Obs.  98  98  98  98 
         
Adj. R  0.112  0.074  0.104  0.061 
 
The standard errors are reported below the coefficient and * and + indicate significance at 
the 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
These results confirm the findings for the post-World War II period of Schwert 
(1977) and Keim and Madhavan (2000) that seat returns did not predict market returns, 
although the latter found that seat activity does have information.   Specifically, they   18 
found that lagged innovations of trading volumes in the seat market predict the monthly 
excess returns of the S&P500 after controlling for the dividend yield and book-to-market 
ratio.  Whether the information contained in the number of seats traded in the 1920s is 
different, is not clear, as it may have been clouded by the big increase in the number of 
seats. 
 
Who Bought the NYSE Seats? 
 
Even with 1,110 members, the brokers on the exchange constituted a large old 
boys’ club.  Although anyone could buy a seat, a prospective member had to be presented 
by one of the existing members.  The Committee on Admissions took a close and hard 
look at their character, rejecting those judged unfit by a blackballing process.  Moser 
(2006) has presented evidence that this process was sufficiently restrictive to permit some 
ethnic discrimination and effectively raise the price to those affected groups, especially 
during  World  War  I  when  Germans  and  German-Americans  were  treated  with  great 
suspicion. 
  The  expansion  of  the  exchange  by  an  additional  275  seats  began  in  February 
1929, and although many seats were quickly formed from the quarter-seat rights, it was 
unfinished by the time of the crash and dragged on through the early 1930s.  Part of this 
delay is attributable to members holding on to their seats, hoping for a higher price; but 
there also may have been a relative dearth of qualified members who would not have 
been blackballed.  It is unlikely that the expansion of the exchange did not lower the 
experience  and  quality  of  the  brokers  and  reduce  discrimination,  introducing  brokers 
perhaps more inclined to “irrational exuberance.”  Many of the new brokers were able to   19 
get on the exchange sooner than they had expected, being already experienced workers 
on the exchange or with partnerships whose members were active brokers. 
Reports  in  the  newspapers  give  a  fairly  detailed  picture  of  some  of  the  new 
members, even if they are impressionistic.  The boom in the stock market was drawing in 
some men who appear to have had little or no experience.   Just before the seat dividend 
in January 1929, Lee-Adam Gimbel, 32 years old, resigned as vice president of Gimbel 
Brothers, Inc and bought a seat for $575,000; and though he remained a director of the 
department store, he became an unaffiliated floor trader.  (New York Times January 5, 
1929, p. 15).  As a floor broker, Gimbel traded on his own account, no doubt, hoping to 
quickly make a fortune.
8  Floor traders who had been in short supply (Davis, Neal, and 
White 2005) were the most adventurous as they had to hustle on the floor, risking their 
own capital, by matching incoming orders brought by other brokers, usually within the 
bid-ask spread set by the market maker at the post.  Two cousins Laurence C. Leeds and 
Robert L. Leeds, both directors of the Manhattan Shirt Company, bought seats. (New 
York Times January 12, 1929, p. 14.) to become independent floor traders.  Others like 
Frederic L. Yeager obtained a seat to become a floor trader for the firm of Sutro Brothers 
& Co, a rapidly expanding Pacific Coast brokerage house with seats on the San Francisco 
and Los Angeles Stock Exchanges as well as seats on the curb exchanges of those cities.  
Seeking to get in on the booming New York market, Sutro Brothers bought the business 
of Robinson & Co. in New York and transferred that firms’ membership on the exchange 
to its New York representatives.  (New York Times, January 18, 1929, p. 38).    
                                                 
8 Later, in July 1929, he was joined floor by Louis S. Gimbel Jr., also a director for Gimbel Brothers, Inc. 
in acquiring a seat.   20 
The seat dividend in February 1929 allowed more young men to move onto the 
floor of the exchange.  George F. Hawkins, a telephone clerk became one of the youngest 
members of the exchange at the age of 22 when he was “rewarded” with a seat by his 
employer, Ira Haupt & Co. (New York Times February 26, 1929, p. 42).  Others came 
from  off  the  exchange.  The  New  York  Times  (February  22,  1929)  noted  that  James 
Russell Lowell, a great-grandson of the poet bought four rights and became a member of 
Wrenn Brothers. 
In the next several months, newspaper reports highlighted the arrival of young 
men on the floor of the exchange.   Telephone clerks, William C. Pressman bought a seat, 
(New  York  Times,  July  12,  1929,  p.  35),  as  did  George  Dolan  of  Maxwell  &  Co. 
Similarly, John Dempsey, a telephone clerk for Hoge Underhill & Co, put together a seat 
in March 1929.  Thomas F. Kelly had been a page on the floor of the NYSE for fourteen 
years when he was able to buy four “rights” acquire a seat in July 1929 and become a 
partner in the firm, Joseph & Co. that he had served.  At the same time, Strother B. Purdy 
a telephone clerk, James L. Slee an advertising salesman, and Paul Pryibil, a customer’s 
man with F. B. Keech acquired seats.  George C. Donelon who had been a specialist’s 
clerk for only six months and was only 22 years old bought a seat in September 1929 
(New York Times, September 23, 1929, p. 50).   However, there were some older men 
who took the risk of buying a seat, and Justin A. Morrisey a tube man on the floor of the 
NYSE since 1911 bought a membership in September 1929 
Members of brokerages also moved onto the floor, as did Harry C. Schaack of 
Harris,  Winthrop  &  Co  (New  York  Times  September  13,  1929,  p.  43).    Some  new 
members of the NYSE had previously served as brokers on the New York Curb.  David   21 
H. McDermott, a member of the New York Curb firm of Peter P. McDermott & Co., 
obtained a seat (New York Times March 23, 1929, p. 32).  Similarly, in July 1929, Harry 
W. Asher Jr. a member of the New York Curb Exchange put together a seat from the 
quarter-seat rights.  Out-of-town brokerages used the seat-dividend to gain direct access 
to the floor.   For example, William H. Bixby of George H.Walker & Co. of St. Louis. 
and  John F. Betts a member of John F. Betts & Co. of St. Louis acquired seats.  Other 
new brokers often came from non-brokerage firms, including Frederick T. Sutton and 
Harold W. Jennys, who were investment bankers. (New York Times July 26, 1929, p. 
31).   
Older members of the exchange may have been happy to relinquish their seats and 
quarter-seat rights to more optimistic outsiders.   If some members believed that they 
observed  a  bubble  in  the  market,  this  would  have  caused  a  downward  shift  in  each 
broker’s ask price.  Even if potential buyers did become more exuberant, such a shift 
would result in more trades with brokers who had a lower reservation bid price.  Moving 
down the schedule of bid prices one would encounter potential brokers who placed a 
lower value on their human capital.  Consequently, we would expect to observe younger 
men buying seats if there was a bubble perceived by established brokers.  While there is 
no data compiled on the age and experience of brokers, the limited journalistic evidence 
suggests an inflow of new and inexperienced younger men to the floor of the exchange. 
 
 
The New York Curb and the Regional Exchanges 
 
  The New York Stock Exchange was by far the most active market for securities in 
the U.S. and had the largest number of brokers.  However, the sheer growth of trading in   22 
the late 1920s threatened the NYSE’s dominance.  It struggled to handle the soaring 
volume of orders and lost market share until it increased its capacity from 1,100 to 1,375 
brokers in 1929 (Davis, Neal and White, 2005).  The other exchanges eagerly expanded 
to capture orders for regional stocks and NYSE-listed securities.   
  The  New  York  Curb  Exchange,  which  later  became  the  American  Stock 
Exchange, was the second largest market.   Its 550 brokers traded many securities that 
were not listed on the NYSE.  The Curb brokers did not usually compete with the NYSE 
but  cooperated  and  served  as  a  market  for  non-NYSE  listed  securities,  with  NYSE 
members placing orders for unlisted stocks with Curb brokers.  Thus, the Curb primarily 
complemented rather than competed with the NYSE.   Regional exchanges, on the other 
hand,  specialized  in  local  stocks  and  competed  for  business  with  the  New  York 
exchanges in its listed securities. The Curb exchange’s volume was only a fraction of the 
volume on the NYSE; its aggregate value (the total value of its seats) was at most 10 
percent of the NYSE’s aggregate value.  Trading volume was even lower on regional 
exchanges; taken all together their total volume approximated the volume on the New 
York Curb.  The smaller number of seats and the lower level of activity on the regional 
exchanges and the Curb led to much less frequent trading in seats. 
The Commercial and Financial Chronicle provides data on the last traded seat 
prices for the Curb and regional exchanges.  Because of infrequent trading, some printed 
regional exchange prices were very stale, as they could have been transacted months 
before.  The  Chronicle  sometimes  also  reported  the  bid-ask  spread  on  the  seats 
(information not available for the NYSE in this period).  Figure 4 displays indices of   23 
volume and seat prices for the Curb Exchange and Figure 5 the seat prices for the six 
most active regional exchanges in the late 1920s with those for the Curb and the NYSE.   
Figure 4 
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 Paralleling the NYSE, the Curb market also experienced a meteoric rise in the 
price its seats.   Through the early 1920s and well into 1928, the prices of seats generally 
followed the movement of volume on the Curb, as seen in Figure 4.   Again resembling 
the NYSE, seat prices begin to rapidly outpace volume growth by late 1928, jumping in 
1929.   Indeed, Figure 4 suggests that the Curb market might have benefited from its 
complementary role by the expansion of the NYSE.  The NYSE’s increase in the number 
of  brokers  primarily  served  to  manage  the  rise  in  orders,  to  which  new  listings   24 
contributed modestly. In contrast, the Curb, as well as the regional exchanges, added 
many new stocks to their boards during 1929; with the expectation of future trading from 
these issues.  Unfortunately, there is no monthly data on listings to adequately track these 
changes. 
Business  on  the  regional  exchanges  was  also  booming.    The  fastest  growing 
exchanges  were  Chicago,  San  Francisco  and  Los  Angeles;  and  the  two  California 
exchanges created their own curb exchanges to handle new start-up companies and less 
seasoned stocks.  Chicago had 225 seats, raised to 470 in October 1929; consequently, its 
adjusted seat price is also reported in Figure 5.   San Francisco had 70 seats and its Curb 
had 100 seats.   Los Angeles and its Curb each had 70 seats, increasing to 75 and 87 in 
1929. The venerable Philadelphia exchange had 206 seats, and Baltimore and Boston had 
87 and 139 respectively.  The markets for these seats were very thin, where trades were 
relatively rare.    It is thus much more difficult to determine what the expectations of the 
brokers were in these markets given their illiquidity.  This feature is reflected in the bid-
ask spreads that were quite wide.  For example, the bid-ask spread measured from mid-
quote or the last transaction was 17 percent for Boston and Chicago and 25 percent for 
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Except  for  Baltimore,  seat  prices  rose  on  all  the  regional  exchanges  in  1929.  
However, the strong bulls were Chicago and the West Coast exchanges and their new 
curb markets.  Although Figure 5 displays rising prices on the regional exchanges, it also 
shows the illiquidity of seats on these smaller exchanges, with few transactions for many 
months before and after the crash.  In addition, Figure 5 strongly suggests that the bloom 
was off the rose by early 1929 for most brokers, as prices failed to rise or even fell.  For 
the  NYSE,  as  already  seen,  split-adjusted  prices  fell  in  the  second  quarter  and  then   26 
rebounded  in  the  third.      This  recovery  after  a  considerable  period  of  pessimism  is 
mirrored in the behavior of the Curb’s seat prices. All the regionals appear to have been 
similarly affected by this pessimism, even though their prices did not decline.  As in other 
thin asset markets, seat owners held on to their seats and waited for an improvement in 
price rather than try to sell them for a loss.  The regionals’ pessimism may also have 
reflected the fact that prices for smaller stocks had peaked in the first quarter of 1929 and 
the boom only continued in the larger stocks.
9   The only exception to this development 
was the Chicago market where seat prices rose to a new high just prior to the increase in 
the number of seats on that exchange in October 1929.   
  To examine whether the Curb or regional brokers may have exhibited excessive 
optimism or pessimism, the model of seat returns from equation (1) was applied to the 
New York Curb Exchange and the Chicago and Philadelphia exchanges and estimates are 
shown  in  Tables  3  and  4.      Chicago  and  Philadelphia  were  selected  because  of  the 
relatively large number of seats, which were traded more frequently than other regional 
seats. Volume data was available for the Chicago and Philadelphia exchanges from the 
Commercial and Financial Chronicle, and for the Curb Exchange from the New York 
Times; but there was no stock price index available for any of these exchanges.   In its 
place the excess returns to holding the Federal Reserve’s stock index was used. 




                                                 
9 The Fisher (1966) index of stocks, which is equally weighted, began to fall in February 1929, while the 
Dow Jones, composed only of large stocks, and the Federal Reserve index weighted by capitalization, 
continued to rise.   27 
Table 3 



































The standard errors are reported below the coefficient and * and + indicate significance at 
























Intercept  0.028  0.021  0.024 
  0.185  0.031  0.025 
rm, t – rf, t  0.066  1.371  -0.035 
  0.270  1.540  0.277 
rm, t-1 – rf, t-1  0.386  0.827  0.441 
  0.287  1.662  0.291 
rm, t-2 – rf, t-2  1.499*  -0.613  1.497* 
  0.271  0.071  0.277 
 Monthly Vol t   -0.016  -0.061  0.099 
  0.037  0.071  0.043 
Monthly Vol t-1  -0.23  0.023  -0.054 
  0.038  0.075  0.046 
Monthly Vol t-2  0.043  0.036  0.045 
  0.037  0.074  0.043 
SizePrem t   -0.675  -0.136  -0.697 
  0.338+  1.196  0.345 
SizePrem t-1  -0.220  1.346  -0.344 
   0.397  1.128  0.409 
SizePrem t-2  -0.622  -0.030  -0.617+ 
  0.361+  1.131  0.372 
No. Obs.  126  54  72 
       
Adj. R  0.319  0.066  0.442   28 
Figure 6 
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The fit of the model for the Curb Exchange is somewhat weaker than it was for 
the NYSE, perhaps reflecting some of the data compromises and the fact that there is no 
volume data before February 1923.  Two lagged values of the independent variables are 
required here to capture their influence.  Again the model is at its weakest for the period 
just before the stock market boom when there are fewer observations.   Nevertheless, the 
estimation for the first period, 1923-1927 was employed to forecast seat prices out-of-
sample, as was done for the NYSE.   Both cumulative abnormal returns and forecast seat 
prices were constructed, and the latter are shown in Figure 6.   The fit of the model is 
fairly good for 1928, and the expansion of the NYSE does not appear to be viewed as 
having  any  positive  or  negative  effects  on  the  business  of  the  Curb,  as  the  forecast   29 
remains  on  track  when  the  information  about  the  seat  dividend  on  the  NYSE  was 
released.   However, early in 1929, the forecast for seat prices moves well ahead of actual 
prices on the Curb exchange.  Like their brethren on the NYSE, the Curb brokers appear 
to have become very skeptical about the rising market.  Only after the crash do actual and 
forecast prices realign themselves, and the fit of the model improves. 
 
Table 4 
Monthly Returns to a Seat on the Chicago and Philadelphia Exchanges 
 
The standard errors are reported below the coefficient and * and + indicate significance at 
the 5 and 10 percent levels. 
 
Estimation of the determinants of seat prices on the regional exchanges in Table 4 
fares less well.   There is comparatively little movement in regional seat prices and the 
Federal  Reserve’s  stock  market  index  may  not  accurately  reflect  events  on  these 
  (1) 
Chicago 




























Intercept  0.036  0.011  0.080  0.012  0.007  0.014 
  0.022  0.016  0.051  0.016  0.012  0.016 
rm, t – rf, t  0.022  0.166  -0.008  -1.227*  -0.371  -1.226* 
  0.387  0.565  0.623  0.241  0.425  0.244 
rm, t-1 – rf, t-1  0.637+  -0.531  1.059+  0.640*  0.107  0.635* 
  0.384  0.538  0.623  0.244  0.414  0.243 
 Monthly Vol t   -0.060  -0.067  -0.062  -0.400*  -0.016  -0.041* 
  0.054  0.048  0.095  0.020  0.013  0.019 
Monthly Vol t-1  -0.041*  0.011  -0.093  -0.002  0.000  -0.002 
  0.054  0.049  0.098  0.020  0.013  0.020 
SizePrem t   1.099+  1.275  0.965  -1.286*  0.102  0.206 
  0.619  0.949  0.969  0.409  0.691  0.319 
SizePrem t-1  1.057*  0.590  1.213  0.521  0.308  -0.114 
  0.523  0.774  0.824  0.337  0.576  0.337 
No. Obs.  167  95  72  167  95  72 
             
Adj. R  0.037  0.045  0.011  0.146  0.000  0.182   30 
exchanges, dominated many local issues.  Philadelphia’s poor fit is perhaps not surprising 
as  there  were  few  transactions  in  the  face  of  huge  movements  by  the  market.  
Nevertheless,  even  the  more  active  market  for  Chicago’s  seats  does  not  yield  an 
informative fit.   Given the poor fit of these equations, attempts to extract abnormal 
returns to measure brokers’ optimism or pessimism failed, as predicted seat price values 
scarcely moved.   
As the stock market soared to new heights, was brokers’ anxiety a generalized 
phenomenon or were the Curb and the regional exchanges influenced by the market for 
seats  on  the  NYSE?      Any  excessive  pessimism  or  optimism  from  New  York,  the 
dominant exchange, may have spilled over.  To test this possibility, news from New York 
is extracted from the residuals obtained by differences between the actual and predicted 
prices for NYSE seats, using the coefficients for 1920-1927 in Table 1.   This information 
contributes modestly to explaining the behavior of the returns for seats on the Curb and 
the regionals.   For Philadelphia, it appears that good news  for the NYSE, a positive 
residual was initially taken as bad news for this exchange given the negative coefficient 
on  the  first  lagged  residual.    However,  this  opinion  was  subsequently  overturned,  as 
indicated by the subsequent coefficient of reserve sign and nearly equal value.  For the 
Curb and the Chicago exchange, news in the form of changes in the price of a seat on the 
NYSE had little effect on the determination of their seat prices.  Overall, the data does 
not  suggest  that  optimism  or  pessimism  from  the  New  York  market  spread  to  other 
exchanges.    If  there  was  a  feeling  among  brokers  that  the  investing  public  was 
excessively exuberant, it appears to have been widespread. 
   31 
Table 5 
News From the NYSE and 



























































Intercept  -0.081  -0.055  0.016 
  0.108  0.075  0.104 
rm, t – rf, t  0.091  -1.096*  0.037 
  0.404  0.247  0.312 
rm, t-1 – rf, t-1  0.537  0.492*  0.982* 
  0.401  0.247  0.310 
 Monthly Vol t   -0.071  -0.042*  -0.061 
  0.055  0.020  0.042 
Monthly Vol t-1  -0.032  -0.012  -0.025 
  0.055  0.020  0.042 
SizePrem t   1.292+  -0.982  -0.074 
  0.663  0.430*  0.390 
SizePrem t-1  0.974+  -0.197  0.355 
   0.553  0.348  0.408 
NYSE Resid t   0.012  -0.024*  -0.000 
  0.016  0.011  0.013 
NYSE Resid t-1  -0.009  0.001  -0.011 
  0.015  0.011  0.012 
NYSE Resid t-2  0.011  0.031*  0.014 
  0.017  0.012  0.014 
No. Obs.  166  166  127 
       
Adj. R  0.033  0.176  0.092   32 
Wise Brokers? 
 
  Spotting a bubble during the rise of a market or econometrically measuring it after 
a collapse is a hazardous enterprise because of the difficulty of properly identifying the 
fundamentals.  Established brokers, familiar with their customers and the flow of orders 
onto the floor of the exchange might be thought to have a better view of the market than 
the average investor.  There were enormous stakes for the brokers; while volume may 
surge  during  a  boom  and  crash,  it  collapsed  in  the  aftermath,  driving  down  profits.  
Members of the NYSE found their exchange’s dominance threatened by the mid-1920s.  
It could no longer absorb more volume on peak days without higher costs arising in the 
form of  greater bid-ask spreads and delays in processing orders.   By expanding the 
exchange by 25 percent, the NYSE apparently eased the constraints while maintaining 
profits.  Yet by the third quarter of 1929, the burgeoning market appears to have worried 
them and the prices of seats were well below what would have been expected.    This 
concern  also  seems  to  have  taken  grip  of  the  Curb  and  the  regional  markets.  
Furthermore, there is some journalistic evidence that  younger men sought out NYSE 
seats and the quarter-seat rights to form new seats, as the older and perhaps wiser men 
abandoned the exchange.  Other market anomalies corroborate brokers’ anticipation of a 
crash.  The willingness of investors to pay unprecedented premia on closed-end mutual 
funds is evidence of a rush by new investors into a bubble market.  The extraordinarily 
heightened  risk  premia  and  margin  on  brokers’  loans  also  reveals  that  lenders to  the 
market were apprehensive and thought a big drop was imminent.  Unfortunately, for the 
common investor this information was not appreciated and they continued to pay share 
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